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The Aesthetics of Politics 
 
The aesthetic and the political   
 It is one of the wonders of philosophy that an idea should persist despite all 
possible evidence for abandoning it.  Of the many ideas to which this comment can 
apply, the one that is most pertinent here is the belief in the autonomy of art.  One can 
understand why such a belief should take hold.  Many factors connected with art 
suggest that much of its force and value lies in the relative independence of making and 
appreciating art.  The creative impulse is always unbridled and unpredictable, and often 
it is coupled with the healthy influence of deliberate iconoclasm.  Less obvious is the 
directness of aesthetic engagement in appreciation and its opportunity for original 
experience.  But independence is a different matter from autonomy, and claims for 
absolute self-sufficiency in art, as in social life, are wishful but ungrounded.   
 
 Our reconsideration of the aesthetic and the artistic did not support the autonomy 
of the artistic enterprise but, on the contrary, demonstrated its responsiveness to the 
forces in the human world.  Whether as subject-matter, referent, incentive, or motive, 
the larger and all-inclusive social world is immanent in art in diverse and often 
unpredictable ways.1  And, conversely, aesthetic perception, which lies at the heart of 
art, is immanent and pervasive in the human world.  Exposing the many strands and 
layers of the influence of the aesthetic, as I have tried to do, reveals as much about 
human sociality as about art.   
 
 It is not easy or simple to peer through the conceptual miasma that blankets 
perceptual experience.  At the same time, a stunning revelation emerges as we begin to 
recognize the influences that inform it.  I have already described how perception is 
never wholly private but is shrouded in multiple associations, structures, and 
assumptions through which it is shaped, directed, and interpreted.  This has profound 
political implications.  It means, in fact, that there is no clear beginning:  no pure 
sensation, no guiding axiom, no original condition, no sensus communis.  Nor can we 
begin with radical subjectivity, with consciousness, phenomenology notwithstanding.  In 
fact, we must recognize the presumption rather than the priority of subjectivity, that 
storm anchor of the Western philosophical tradition.   
 
 Subjectivism, moreover, is not only a misleading idea and a dangerous illusion:  it 
is also an obstacle to a transformative politics.  Few commentators have been able to 
liberate themselves from its tenacious pull,2 and this inability acts to impede and indeed 
prevent the re-founding of a politics of freedom.  For freedom, as it is commonly 
understood, is bound up in the related tradition of individualism yet, as we have seen, 
the assumptions underlying individualism can also be placed in serious question.  Yet 
how else can we proceed?  How else can we conceive of freedom, of the political 
sphere, of the human world if not in terms of subjectivity and individualism?   
 
 In its root meaning as sense perception, aesthetics, when pursued with an effort 
to set aside cognitive meaning and prejudgment, becomes a kind of radical 
phenomenology.  Perception is never pure, never somatically direct, as William James 
pointed out,3 and we saw earlier how we invariably edit and add to sensation.4  One of 
philosophy’s unending tasks is to articulate and examine the grounds and significance 
of pre-cognitive processes and, perhaps we might add, post-cognitive processes, as 
well as cognitive ones. These processes are well-disguised behind multiple structures 
designed to hide or render them palatable, from the euphemisms of linguistic fig leaves 
to self-gratifying, pseudo-scientific cosmologies religious or ideological in origin.  Burke 
saw the danger with admirable clarity:  “When we go but one step beyond the 
immediately sensible qualities of things, we go out of our depth.  All we do after, is but a 
faint struggle, that shews we are in an element which does not belong to us.”5   
  
 Setting aside the natural attitude, the classical precondition to phenomenological 
description, is only one of philosophy’s primary steps.  To suspend the assumption of 
existence only begins Salome’s dance by discarding the outermost of the many 
interpretive layers that veil sense perception.  Indeed, the source of much of the 
continuing freshness and vitality of the arts lies in their uninhibited use of pre-cognitive 
perception, a force that persists despite every effort to capture and constrain art by 
reductive explanations. 
 
 Let me review briefly some of what we now understand about the multifarious 
influences on sense perception.  We know, with all the qualifications that must be 
assigned to any knowledge claim, that social influences and pressures affect our 
apprehension of the very data of sensory perception.  Social psychologists have 
amassed a large body of experimental evidence that documents the effects of such 
influence.6  We have also noted the powerful challenge to the presumed objectivity and 
independence of truth provided by the continuing work in the sociology of knowledge 
that began in the 1920s and ‘30s.  This shows how our understanding of reality is 
socially constructed, and that “whatever passes for ‘knowledge’ in a society…is 
developed, transmitted and maintained in social situations” and forms the reality that is 
taken for granted. 7    The very foundation of what is distinctively human in perception is 
its character as a socially and historically achieved and changing mode of action; and is 
thereby invested with a cognitive, affective and teleological character that exemplifies 
perception as a social and not merely a biological or neurophysiological activity.  What 
is more, perception is not an activity of the perceptual system or of a specific sense-
modality but an activity of the whole organism. Heidegger, too, recognized the powerful 
influence of cultural tradition.  "All philosophical discussion, even the most radical 
attempt to begin all over again, is pervaded by traditional concepts and thus by 
traditional horizons and traditional angles of approach."8   
 
 More recently, deconstruction has emerged as a methodology of critical analysis 
and argumentation for questioning underlying ideas and raising basic questions without 
limit or end, a kind of terminal yet productive incompleteness.  We might even 
complement this by recognizing in the body of theoretical and practical certitude offered 
by the sciences the unavoidable but qualifying influence of the experimenter on every 
investigation.  What well may be emerging here is a vastly different notion of human 
knowledge from the ideal of absolute certitude and completeness that has stood as the 
standard from classical times to the twentieth century.  I do not mean to diverge into an 
epistemological study here, but it is necessary for our critical purposes to acknowledge 
these factors as the ground for any discussion of basics and beginnings and not to 
elevate consuetude beyond its proper measure. 
 
 This is not to psychologize or sociologize philosophy but to recognize that 
philosophy is not independent and that its claims for priority are inadequate if they do 
not take into account the psychological and social conditions that affect all inquiry.  The 
attempt to find a true beginning in consciousness, whether perceptual or cognitive, 
cannot be sustained.  At the same time, we need not wait for physiological psychology 
to explain what constitutes consciousness:  brain functions can identify organic causal 
events but they do not dissolve their manifestations.  Consciousness may be a question 
but it is not an answer. 
 
 Considerable illumination comes from the work of anthropologists, sociologists, 
and other behavioral scientists, all of whom have demonstrated in detail the formation of 
conscious thought in the human interactions through which cultural, linguistic, historical, 
and cognitive ideas and structures are shaped and absorbed.  The body of evidence 
accrued by these sciences is overwhelming.  What is needed is to acknowledge that 
evidence and incorporate it into our philosophical deliberations.  Putting aside traditions 
ignorant of such facts is the pre-condition of fresh and liberating understanding.  This is 
hardly the final truth in such matters, for we cannot legislate future inquiry, but it enables 
us to dispense with whatever inherited doctrines cannot endure the light of the present.   
 
Aesthetic politics 
 To what kind of politics can an aesthetics of perception lead?  Much of the history 
of Western political thought is mired in mythology, and one of the most persistent myths 
concerns the origin of the human community.  Indeed, origins are one of the favored 
subjects of myth and the seventeenth century fiction of the state of nature incorporated 
many of the common explanatory features of such myths.  I call this a fiction because it 
is an entirely imaginative construction that provides a presumably rational explanation of 
the formation of community out of a loose, inchoate collection of people who, in a 
correlative myth, contract with one another to establish political order.  The presumptive 
conditions under which they do this vary with the version, such as the classic ones 
proposed by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Hume or, more recently, by Rawls’s notion 
of the “original position.”  And just as varied are the political orders that they justify, from 
absolute monarchy to liberal democracy. One can understand the appeal to an age of 
reason of so rational a reconstruction, but this merely adds a second myth to the first, of 
a social contract to a state of nature, pandering to our present age of narrow calculation 
in the service of wider unreason.  Still, the myth of a pre-social condition persists. 
 
 As we have seen throughout this book, an aesthetically-guided philosophical 
process can help identify and expose the multiple layers of assumptions, constructions, 
axiomatic presuppositions, and cultural teachings that obscure sense perception so 
thickly.  Salome’s dance never ends. Still, it is appropriate to ask if the landscape of an 
aesthetic politics begins to appear through the haze.  Do we discern there the polis as 
the model of an aesthetic polity?  Is it still useful as an ideal of human community, for 
with all its historical limitations and failings, the polis was, for a brief time, actual?  Much 
of its appeal lies in the fact that the polis joined community with law and a participatory, 
self-determining socio-political process in which there was no alienation of citizen and 
state.9  
 
 And what of the perceptual commons?  What can this contribute to an aesthetic 
politics?   I believe there is much to be discovered here.  The perceptual commons is a 
germinal idea that expands into a many-petalled bloom.  It can contribute to dispelling 
the mists of myth before the direct force of experience.  And still more important, it 
provides the basis for commonality and all the nurturing support this condition can 
provide. 
 
 Many features of a positive politics are implicit in the idea of a perceptual 
commons.  The presence of such a commons entitles everyone who shares that 
experience to participate equally in its enhancements and possibilities.  Entitlement 
without access is empty, and therefore conditions and facilities must be present that 
enable all people to make free and full use of the commons.  Enabling, however, is not 
sufficient, for people have not only to be informed but induced to participate, and so the 
availability of the commons needs also to be promoted.  From this emerges, not the 
familiar ethics of penury but an ethics of profusion.  And from this we can generate an 
ethics of care, not conflict; of justice, not privilege.   
 
 To emphasize the aesthetic in experience is to engage in openness, cooperation, 
connectedness, vulnerability.  Ken-ichi Sasaki observes that “When it was coming into 
existence, aesthetics was charged with the real and urgent philosophical problem of its 
time: how to construct a new world.”10  This remains its continuing charge in the face of 
what stands as a perennial problem.  Perhaps emancipation from a tradition of negative 
mythology and the practices of negative sociality will make it possible for a new 
aesthetics to provide a source of new patterns to develop and fresh models to emulate 
in the quest for positive culture.11 
 
Conclusion 
 The task of constructing the outlines of a new world is, I believe, the most urgent 
philosophical challenge of our time, and it is by starting with aesthetics that this can best 
be undertaken.  To show why and how this reconstruction can proceed has been the 
intent of this book.  Its breadth of inquiry has encompassed the major domains of 
philosophic thought: ontology and metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, social and 
political philosophy, all under the guidance of an aesthetics of perception.  It has been 
necessary to cast the range of inquiry so broadly in order both to ground the aesthetic 
and to establish its proper context.  But what I most hope to have done is clear the 
terrain of many of the conceptual and structural obstacles that confound our thought 
and occlude our understanding, difficulties for many of which philosophy is particularly 
responsible.  And I hope to have established the conditions for the power of the 
aesthetic to illuminate and liberate our grasp of the world on which we have placed our 
indelible mark. 
 
 It may be that the perceptual commons we have been considering is another way 
of identifying the human environment, the human world, and that in shaping 
environment we are enhancing and making coherent all its participating constituents.  
How this perceptual landscape is appropriated, designed, and populated concerns 
everyone, and it allows endless possibilities, both aesthetic and political.  We cannot 
help but be affected by the crass and exploitative uses of the human environment in the 
political, military, industrial, and commercial co-optations of the perceptual conditions of 
human life.  An aesthetics of perception offers an alternative, and this, in turn, can 
provide the means by which to transform the human world. 
 
 But even as the perceptual commons is environmental, it is first and foremost 
aesthetic.  This is why the aesthetic verges on the political and where its unique social 
contribution lies.  Such a perspective leads Sasaki to note, 
What we learn from early modern aesthetics is that when basic values 
become suspect and or even invalid, aesthetic judgment is the only path 
towards the establishment of new values…. [M]easuring the goodness of a 
new world by its beauty can also be an important guide at a turning point in 
civilization.  But consider this: there is beauty in the tracks of missiles flying 
against a dark sky, and sublimity in the collapse of a glacier.  While beauty 
is the only direct mark of value, it is also involved in an undeniable 
ambiguity in our contemporary civilization.  I am convinced that the most 
real and important task of aesthetics is to speculate on this ambiguity on the 
horizon of our global civilization. 12   
 
 Sasaki echoes Schiller by introducing beauty in establishing new values.  The 
aesthetics of politics is not about beauty in the conventional sense as commonly applied 
to art and nature, or even in an extended sense when attached to character or to a life.  
I am not proposing in the aestheticization of culture a culture of aesthetics, of aesthetes, 
or of art.  Yet the concept of beauty does nonetheless crystallize the core of positive 
value that is fulfilled in the aesthetic.  Understood in this way, beauty may be taken to 
represent or, better yet, to symbolize the fulfillment of a social aesthetic.   
 
 Perhaps, then, I can conclude this inquiry into the power of the aesthetic to 
transform the human world by turning to it as a standard of fulfillment and not only of 
criticism.  For the aesthetic possesses the capabilities of both. The ambiguity of beauty 
can only be resolved by recognizing its inseparability from the moral.  The experience of 
beauty, Schiller argued, brings people together; it reconciles conflicts within a person 
and among people.  Beauty is thus not mere delectation but a conciliatory force. Its 
social significance lies in its capabilities for reconciliation, and it is this that gives beauty 
a moral standing.   
 
 Indeed, the multivalence of beauty appears in recognizing its bond with the 
moral.  Ultimately the morality of beauty and the beauty of morality cannot be kept 
separate.  Each enhances and contributes to the other.  We can no longer look at any 
event as exclusively aesthetic in the conventional, narrow sense of beauty, for doing so 
only contributes to its isolation.  So we must free ourselves from the myth of aesthetic 
disinterestedness, a view that rests on a contrived, even false ordering of the world.13  It 
is one thing to identify and distinguish aesthetic value; it is quite another to separate it 
from its inherence in the objects, events, and conditions of the human world.   
 
 What is most forceful in a fulfilled experience with the arts is our complete 
absorption in perceptual experience that has temporal depth conjoined with the 
resonance of memory and meaning, what I have called aesthetic engagement.  Yet this 
account of aesthetic experience in the arts is at the same time a description of human 
relations, both personal and social, at their most fulfilling – of a social aesthetic.  For in 
the aesthetic we discover the human world, and in reconstituting the aesthetic we laid 
the groundwork for reconstructing a more humane world.  This world is first aesthetic, 
and that is why the aesthetic verges on the political, where its transformative powers 
make possible its unique social contribution. 
 
I know the truth! All other truths - out of my sight! 
There is no cause for us to hold these fights and battles! 
Just take a look: there’s evening, look: there’s night. 
Why do we fight - O poets, lovers, and commanders? 
 
The grass is dewy and the wind has settled down, 
And soon, the vortex of the stars will stop, 
And we shall all sleep with our foes below the ground, 
Though on this earth, we kept each other up.                                                               
       Marina Tsvetaeva14 
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